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W e have had quite a 10t of allegories in J apan which are expressed by “as if" 
phrases. For instance， a phrase: it is so and so “as if not to see a wood for a tree"l) 
means that we shou1d not forget to grasp the matter as a who1e (a wood)， by merely 
satisfying to gaze at its parts (a tree). This may beapp1icable to the problems we now 
are faced with， that is， those of 1ega1 thinking at present. As we know， somany trends of 
lega1 thinking that can not be numbered: natura1 1aw and legal positivism， pragmatic 
and marxist theory of law， etc.， have been deve10ped in the contemporary world of 1aw， 
in competing with each other. Moreover， quite a few of them are making an effort 
to set logically their own working五e1dsin order and to define borderline with one 
another. In this respect， it is perhaps undeniable that partiaZ analysis and logical arran-
gement of such parts are a primary concern for each 1egal thinking at present. 
* Professor of General Jurisprudence， Osaka University 
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Whatever this五rstimpression of the present situation seems true， however， it
must go to excess to assume that there were no common link or ground connecting each 
different parts. Doesn't such an assumption actually bring on untoward consequences 
that“not to see a wood for a tree"? In this connection， the West or the Western world 
in modern period seems to furnish a key to the better understanding of the common 
link. 
To take a familiar example， naturallaw thinking may well be to serve as an illustra-
tion. It is obvious that natural law coming from Greek philosophy have had a long 
history証sthough having lived sub specieαeternitatis. However， only after the coming 
of the modern West based on civil society and its modern devision of labor， situation 
arround naturallaw too has been changed. As naturallaw thinking has been confronted 
with -such a new situation， itcan not escape from adapting it and modifying itself， 
because it comes to be the very nature of naturallaw thinking， let alone legal thinking 
in general at that time， that it more or less deals with problems raised by positive law， 
namely， the law enacted by civil state power or by its agent (iふ judicialcourts). Here， 
we canfind a change of meaning， accordingly， a renewed charactristic of naturallaw 
thinking in the modern period. That is why the West from modern to present is par幽
ticularly relevant to its understanding. But this is not an isolated and unique example. 
The relevance of the West to legal thinking is the same with legal positivism， pragmatic 
and marxist theory of law as products of modern way of thinking. 
Seen in this light， itappears that each different legal thinking characterized by 
the partical analysis at present have come from the common link of the modern West. 
Why then has it been so only in the world of the West， not of the East or Orient so and 
so? Does actually the modern West have maintained enough tradition worthwhile to 
be the common link? If so， what is a main acharacter of such a tradition? In what manner 
each legal thinking is faced with such a tradition? If it may be diagnosed that each of 
them differentiated and extraordinal1y interested in the partiality is seized with a sickness， 
what is a real way to cure them in connection with the tradition? The more not only 
to see a tree， but a woqd as a whole， the more it is necessary for us to approach the 
problems of this sort. The problems of this sort is certainly the problems to be analyz帽
ed only by takin 
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On the other hand， this does not imply that what is most important here is merely 
to see a wood as a whole. Rather， a grove， a tree， branches and leaves to some extent 
are worthwhile to see as well as a wood. Otherwise， we might go further to the other 
extreme， asit were， which in turn may well be phrased: as if“not to see a tree for a 
wood" (not to see a part for the matter as a whole). For at present， when several trends 
of legal thinking have been developed by providing serious problems in detail concern-
ing to the contemporary legal problems， toclarify each of them in regard to their par同
ticular meaning and role too must be highly considered. 
One way to see a wood， without excluding a tree may well be called the way to 
approach macrocosmic field (below， 1 shall cite it as a macrocosmic approach)， the 
other way to see a tree， without excluding a wood the way to approach microcosmic 
五eld(below， microcosmic approach). Taking account of the common sense saying 
that a wood， a grove and a tree such and such are in the chain of inseparable circulation 
of growth and decay， itis obvious that both approachs， macrocosmic and microcosmic 
too are really indispensable for our enterprise to do. To consider both approachs in 
detail， however， there happen not a few di伍cultiesabout， for instance， from what kind 
of point of view and in what manner we shall perform our enterprise， and to what kind 
of points we shal1 give a special attention. 
It may be useful for the better understanding of the matter， to refer the 
Chinese character used to designate it. For instance， a word Ki or木 designa-
ting a tree being a keyword in Chinese character， a word Mori or森 designating
a wood is composed of three Ki or trees， and a word Hayashi or林 designating
a grove also， of two Ki or trees. 
By the way， 1 would like to refer two recent achievements in respect of the problem 
mentioned above. One is Professor J. Shklar's Legalism，3) the other Professor S. 1. 
Shuman's Legal Positivism.4) Giving a special emphasis on the modern West， the 
former points out socalled legalism as a basis providing common link between each 
different ways of thinking dominant in the West， then it analyzes role and limits of 
legalism within a framework of socio-political system there. It is indeed vital in its 
insistence and macrocosmic approach in its scope which reminds us late professor F. 
Neumann's work.5) On the contrary， the latter makes an effort to reconsider legal 
positivism by distinguishing 1 
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Legalism must be first considered. 
Legalism as a Social Ethos 
From the outset Shklar deals with the theme itself as 1 wrote “vital" in its content. 
“What is legalism? It is the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter 
of rule following， and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined 
by rules". She deems legalism a type of morality. Though it seems vague what a 
word moral and ethical imply， weshal1 presume here that “moral" and “ethical" 
are used in the same connotation. Aside from it， legalism “is also a very common 
social ethos， though by no means theonly one， inWestern countries -lts most nearly 
complete expression is in the great legal systems pf the European world. Lastly， it
has also served as the political ideology of those who cherish these systems of law and， 
above al1， those who are directly involved in their maintenace -the legal profession， 
both bench and bar. The court of law and the trial according to law are the social 
paradigms， the perfection， the very epitome， of legalistic morality". 6) lt may well be 
observed above that legalism is described in a so wider scope that we tend to think 
the description lacking a c1arity. As to words “a very common social ethos" too， which 
is supposed to be a kind of keywords in her attempt， there is no satisfying definition to 
which 1 shal1 refer soon later. However， itis not di伍cultto find legalism in a concept 
of that morality as rule or rule fol1owing morality. From such a core， legalism is fur-
thermore extended to penumbra fields， for instance， tothe Western legal system and 
the political ideology of Western lawyers and legal scholars as its model. 
Moreover， what she is to be saying about legalism becomes c1earer by noticing 
to her remarks that when legalism “becomes self-conscious， when it chal1eges other 
views， itis a ful1-blown ideology". 7) This is relevant to con五rmher intention. For， 
whenever she says leglaism being merely a type of mora1ity， oran ideology， it is naturally 
held that it is nothing but a mora1ity or an ideology within a lot of moralities or ideolo鳳
gies. The same is the case with our common sense. Despite of th巴plainfact， however， 
there are not a few legal scholars as well as philosophers who hold legalism and the 
law as its expression being prior to other moralities or politics etc. and those who， 
resting on such an idea， often lead to the sophisticated effort to distinguish the law 
from non-law， accordingly to construct a formally defined， self-consistent system of 
law. 1 think， 
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To substitute an expression much. more familiar to us for what she has pointed 
out about legalism， it is， more or less， equivalent to the achievement of analytical juris-
prudence and legal positivism. She plainly speaks of the latter as a problem deeply 
rooted in legalism. But it is more deserve attention that she refers not only to legal 
positivism， but natura1 law in regard to it. What then is a relation between both of 
them and lega1ism? Here is a next problem to be examined. 
Lega1ism， Legal Positivism and Natural Law 
The reason why legal positivism and natural law are rclated with one another 
within a common link of legalism， comes from the fact that both of them are based on 
‘、rule"conception. According to the common sense of law， however， this is rather 
unusual， for it is taken for granted that each of them are diametrically opposed. For 
instance， concerning on law and morals， ithas been very often understood that natural 
law lawyers advocate for the proposition that law and morals come into contact with 
each other， whi1e legal positivists reject that proposition.8) But， ifwe might imagine 
furthermore natural1aw lawyers usually daring to mix up law and morals，. it is naturally 
odd and mistaken. Even natural law la，奇yers，let alone legal positivists， allow for 
that there must be som色systemto distinguish between law and morals， and that mora1ity 
too is a matter of rule.9) As to their allowance， natura11aw and positivistic lawγers are 
on the same ground. That is why Shk1ar sees both of them in their intimate relation. 
Turning again to lega1ism， itis also based on the rule conception， whether moral or 
legal or political. For such a reason， Shklar comes to the idea oflegalism as the common 
link to connect legal positivism and naturallaw. If we substitute a word“rule theory" 
or“normativism" for the word legalism， 1 am principally for the idea which Shk1ar 
here has set forth - Once 1 have treated this aspect of the problem in my work，lO) and 
1 shall refer to it soon later -
This being so， Shklar， on the other hand， does not deny any deeply rooted di宜erence
between them arising， when considering their insistence in detail. First， legal posi-
tivists tend to think of law as a discrete entity that is “there" and to distinguish it from 
the other rules like those of moral rule etc， by taking a distinction between “is" and 
“ought" into consideration. Such a tendency mak，es their interests concentrate in a 
formal definition of what is law. She cites analytical jurisprudence， formalism in law， 
H. Kelsen， W. N. Hohfeld and the other as their representatives. Second， she cites 
also many groups of natura1 law thinkers， for example， onto10g1st， essentialist and 
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deontologist. But what is most interesting for her characterization of natural law 
thinking is that she regards it as a thinking placing a special emphasis on agreement or 
unity， since， inorder to insist upon naturallaw universal1y valid iJi a circle of citizen， 
there must be unified agreement of citizen upon it. Forinstance， that she points out 
American realist group being a kind of naturallaw lawyers modified is strange as it may 
sound. But it is not strange if we realize her idea comming from the understanding 
said above.ll) Though she recognizes as a matter of fact such a difference between 
two types of thinking， she does not take it seriously， because the difference or quarrel 
between them is for her nothing but “a family quarrel among legalists" .12) It is indeed 
her way. 1n regard to her way， however， 1 shal1 refer stil more to her own view on 
the legalism which 1 shall tentatively cal1 “Shklarismぺ
Wha主IsShklarism? 
Throughout her book， she repeatedly emphasizes a significance of attitudes to be 
expressed in such a form: do not ignore social diversity and do not miss out on torelant 
mind. At a glance， these attitudes may well be summarized to a proposition: leave 
us alone， accordingly， these look of negative character. To put it precisely， however， 
there is another type of attitudes to be expressed in such a form: do respect minority 
groups， particularly， do give an opportunity for moral dissenters to express their opinion. 
Here we can find the attitudes being attended with somewhat positive character by 
which 1 am deeply impressed through her book. Both types of attitudes， being in their 
mutual relation， construct main characteristics of the book like a web woven together 
by warp and woof. This being so， however， itis incontrovertible that her attitudes 
as a whole are stil modest and negative. 
To remember late professor G. Radbruch as a scholar who pointed out an impor-
tance of virtue of torelance， accordingly of value relativism， itcomes to be obvious that 
Shklarism， partly， istantamount to that relativism of Radbruch，13) and as far as it
asserts to protect minority groups for the manifestation of their own opinion or con-
viction， Shklarism， partly， looks like liberalism. Notwithstanding， 1 think， her idea 
is not exhausted to mere relativism or mere liberalism， but she rather suggests to some 
extent her plain value-orientation while remaining some kind of selfcontradiction. 
First， itsresemblance to liberalism is found in an attempt strongly to oppose to an 
idea like that of“unity" or 也、 soleunified purpose -i.e.“national purpose". Let 
us consider a familiar phrase “freedom under law". 1 t has been for a good long time 
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used as an ideology to distinguish theWest from the Non-Western world. Surely， 
she accepts the fact as estab1ished. But if we further imagine that a political tradition 
of freedom under law has tied al1 of the West“into a neat pattern"， itis for her nothing 
but an overstatement which is to be criticized as an nostalgia of liberalism， or as an 
attempt to ignore any diversity included in the Western history. Therefore， libera1ism 
in Shklar's sense is a liberalism oriented to look to t:he future， that is，“barebones liber-
alism" which is conditioned by the attempt noticed above to avoid most di伍culties
of liberalism merely looking to the past.14) Then， how about the legalism itself， seeing 
from such a point of view? Here too， we can find the same answer. 
Shklar seems not thoroughly criticizes the legalism. She accepts it as a social 
ethos which has been established as such considerably adequate to the Western society 
and which has served to a modernization of legal thinking and the modern law itself.15) 
In this respect， itmay wel1 be noticed that she refers M. Weber's scheme in his religion-
ssociology as a typical model of the legalism. Weber， aswe know， found the cultural 
characteristic underlying the Western society in a scheme of rationality -ex証ctly
speaking offormal rationality， while Shklar does not mention to it -It is the rationality 
which has developed and in turn has been developed in the West巴rnhistory as a ten-
dency to find， to construct and to fol1ow “rule". Roman law， professional lawyer， 
judicial court， capitalist economics， rational social ethics， a吋 puritaismin religion have 
presented the distinct feature of the 予vestin“glaring" contrast o the patrimonial and 
kadi justice of China and Islam and the inner-worldly ethic of the Orient.16) That 
such a characteristic of the rationality is similar to the legalism in respect of rule fol1ow-
ing tendency is so plain that we need not again refer to Shklar's saying. 
The same is the case with the word “social ethos" mentioned above. vVhile she 
does not give any sufficient definition of this word in regard to the legalism， itmay be 
useful to cite again M. Weber's scheme to fil1 in ellipsis in her explanation. Accord-
ing to W eber， there have been special basic mental atmospheres in history which provoke 
each economic actions to get their orientation peculiar for each particular social classes 
or social groups. The basic mental atmosphere was thus cal1e 
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As a matter of course， itmust be presupposed that this mental atmosphere ori蝿
ginally is based on socio-economic conditions of each periods. But， once formed， it
converselly reactions to renew these conditions one of which is the modern capitalism. 
Here is a reciprocal relation between them for their mutual development. Seen in 
this light， the social ethos， aspointed out by professor H. Otsuka，19) can neither be 
said only as a thought， or conversely， only as a social condition or social institution. 
Rather， being located in the middle of them， itplays， asit were， a role as a medium of 
their circulation. To take account of the social ethos having such a meaning and a 
role said above， itis very natural to see that Shklar calls the legalism a social ethos by 
speaking of it in the widest sense， for her approach to the legalism as a social ethos in 
the modern Western society is main1y the same to M. Weber's. 
However， she hesitates to defIne furthermore the legalism as the sole characteristic 
of the West. For her it is a grand ideological attempt to do so. Therefore， tosay that 
what characterizes the Western history is not a tradition， but a social diversi砂 lSa na-
tural consequence for her way of reasoning. If so， what she seems to be emphasizing 
on is to accept that the legalism is the social ethos as considrably dominant in the West， 
as well as to respect minority groups， especially moral dissenters for the manifestation 
of their own opinion or conviction. If here is a core of Shklarism as above summar個
zed， 1 am also chiefly for the idea of Shklarism. 
There is another aspect of the problem to pay attention， inregard to the 
Non-Western wor1d. For instance， there developed also various kind of ethics 
or moral outlooks of the world giving a special emphasis on rule following ati-
tude in the Far East.20) What kind of difference are there between them and 
the legalism as the social ethos in the West is， 1 think， the other task to be per-
formed by Shklar. 
Then， what do Shklar think of legal thinking at present from such a view point 
of the West and by means of the basic understanding of the legalism must be brought 
m questlOn. 
Social Diversi主yand a Problem of Value回Orientation
As she understands both legal thinking， that is， natural law and legal positivism 
located within a framework of the legalism， itmay natural for her to see the merits or 
defects of both legal thinkings together being reduced to those of the legalism. To 
outline her idea， legal positivism has began and ended with a defIntion of the law in a 
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formalistic way. It may well be said that it intellectually appeals us， aslong as it seeks 
to get an impersonal judgement， that is， an objectivity in regard to judicial process. 
It does not， however， appeal to that people who can not escape to choose， or to make 
a preference for himself or for the other under straitned circumstances. In place of 
legal positivism， there appears natural law thinking bypresenting itself firm standard 
for value judgement in practice the former fails to show. Thus， itlays a special em-
phasis on a necessity or viewpoint of unity and agreement (n rules. Whi1e here is 
advantage for practical decision， but a significance of socalled unity according to (na-
tionalりpurposemay so much emphasized that we are afraid if social diversity might 
be lost.21) When we regard the matter in this light， a way of this discussion about 
two contemporary legal thinkings she has shown seems to go round and round like a 
dog chasing its tail. A dog chasing its tail reminds us， inother words， a moral attitude 
to speak of every problems in an extremely modest way without deciding what is the 
best way to answer. It is a relativism in a negative or modest sense. 
Then， isthis the last answer of Shklarism to the contemporary problems? 1 don't 
think so・ But，to explain the reason， 1 must speak of the fundamental underlying her 
way of thinking which at a glance looks like self-contradictory. 
Shklar， inthe former half part of her book， has certainly clarified her idea about 
what is her contribution to the problem of ideology. Her contribution actually comes 
again from the attitudes mentioned above: do respect minority groups， particularly， 
do give an opportunity for moral dissenters to express their opinion. 1 have called it 
above a relativism in a negative sense. But， toconsider once more the same matt巴r
from its another side， that is， from its hidden meaning， her own belief or value-orierト
tation though stilllooking negative， seems to appear， sofar as Shklarism implies that 
it is worthwhile and valuable to maintain a social diversity or to retain an opportunity 
for moral dissenters to express their own conviction etc. This is not a mere value 
relativism， but， we may say， a value absolutism in a negative sense， even though it may 
sound so strange that it reminds us contradictio in adjectio. It is the belief which is‘ 
found in her former half part of the book. How about the latter half part? Here is 
a real problem to be eXplained more. 
In t 
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the crimes against humanity may lead to the consequences to accept a value: humanity 
too and to maintain an ideological insistence in this sense， attended naturally by some 
po1itical considerations. If so， real orientation under1ying Shklarism in this part seems 
to come further to value-absolutism in an original or positive sense far beyond that 
negative sense - It must be noticed that Radbruch made a great contribution as to 
this issue23)ー
On the contra可， in the former part， where she is afraid so much that to accept 
universally valid end and unified value leads to r吋ectionof a social diversity， she brings 
serious demands of value clarification made by M. S. McDougal， or F. Cohen into 
question and hesitates to accept it for the reason above. This attitude means nothing 
but a value-relativism， or at most， a value-absolutism in a negative sense. Isn't there 
logically any difference between to emphasize on a meaning ()f a social diversity and to 
speak of humanity being a firm standard to perfer X to Y within a framework of a 
social diversity， while there seems prima facie to be a similarity between them? In this 
respect， 1 feel， there appears a weakness of Shklarism arising when it proceeds from 
the first to second part. 
It is， however， much more natural to think that the weakness is not due to Shk1arism 
itself， but to a dilemma contemporary legal thinking has been faced with. Therefore， 
Shklarism， despite of such a weakness， sti1 stands out with great effect to emphasize 
thoroughly a significance of a social diversity and to develop her idea under liberal mind. 
She does so because， partly， she is an outsider to the field of law as did S. I. Benn 
and R. S. Peters in their steady and honest cooperative work.24) 
To consider the matter again from an isider's view point， however， itis incontro-
vertible that a trend of her analysis is on the whole of character of macro-analysis， so
that it does not necessary persuade us in several points in d巴tail. For instance， itis 
a well reasoned argument that she points out “to stop classifying law and morals as 
blocks and to treat them instead as a continuumぺ Lookingup law and morals as means 
of social control， there may be no objections to it and no sharp discrepancy between them 
as to their enforcement or sanction. This being so， we can not ignore even today a 
significance of modern state and its power (or judicial power as its part) sti1 functioning 
as minimum means of伊 aranteefor the modern law and f， 
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五canceof modern state and the modern law enacted by this state power in regard to 
the forma1 rationa1ity said above25) - In this connection， itseems stil now necessary 
for us to take account of a meaning of the separation of 1aw and mora1s. This may 
be real1y a trivial or subordinate concern as if not to see a wood for a tree. But， wha・
tever the matter looks trivial and subordinate， only a tree， itsbranches and leaves as 
the suordinate make it possible for a wood as such to grow up and to grow thick. With 
a1 this in mind it becomes apparent that the micro-approach as wel1 as the macro are 
indispensable for our problems. Now we sha11 switch the subjects from the first to 
the second to be treated by the micro-approach as 1 have proposed at first. 
Possibility of Distinction between Analytical Jurisprudence 
a:nd Legal Positivism 
What Shuman deems relevant is to distinguish analytical jurisprudence from legal 
positivism. Then， inwhat way is he doing so? To put it short1y， analytical jurispru-
dence is for him “a way of doing jurisprudence"， while lega1 positivism is“a theory 
about the nature of law"， resting on some definite viewpoint of ethics. If this is only 
註 wholecontentof his argument， it100ks very simple. 8uman， however， does not 
propose the distinction in an aprioristic way， but in an empirica1 way. By adopting 
an empirical method of test acording to preestablished criteria， he tries to describe 
what is ana1ytical jurisprudence and what is 1ega1 positivism. In doing so， severa1 
criteria may be used. At命st(test A)， a 1ega1 positivist is， according to Shuman， one 
who， 1 (a)， maitains that law and mora1s are separate， and 1 (b)， maintains that law is 
a command. To use these criteria， J.Austin wou1d be a 1egal positivist， but H. Kelsen 
wou1d not be “since he rejects 1 (b)." It is much more unreasonab1e for Shuman that 
that even 8t. Augustine might be classified as a 1egal positivist as far as he once recogniz-
ed the criterion 1 (a). Then the second test B is adopted for A. -In this case a legal 
positivist is one who， II(a)， maintains that 1aw and morals are separate， and II (b)， 
maintains a certain view as to the nature of mora1s. At this time Ke1sen becomes 
a legal positivist， for he is rested on noncognitivism as to II (b) which may a1so be 
cal1ed a re1ativism to some extent. Instead， however， Austin is not a lega1 positivist 
on the basis of II (b). 26) After repe証tingthe same kind of test in regad to analytica1 
jurisprudence too， h巴makesa judgment about Austin as an analytica1 jurist and Ke1sen 
as a 1ega1 positivist. Whenever he uses a word ana1ytical jurisprudence， itmeans 
“a method of doi碍 jurisprudencewherein there is concern with the meanings or usages 
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of the terms indigenous to law and their relations with one another and to the rest of 
language". On the contrary， tostate what is law is a task of legal positivism. This 
belief in the distinction， being repeatedly emphasized by him， becomes a basic view 
point to be seen. throughout his book as a whole.27l 
Then it must be qu巴stionedhow we can distinguish them. For， even if we might 
presuppose the distinction appropriate， itdoes not necessary persuade us about the reason 
why Austin is not a legal positivist. Whereas the test A identi五esAustin to be a legal 
positivist， why should the test B have been adopted? It seems for the reason， that Kelsen 
would not be so according to the test A. If so， whatever such a way of his examina-
tion through tests may be empirical， itstil appears so much artificial that it is compelled 
to switch tests from A to B， by the overwhelming force of the conclusion which actually 
is drawn at the beginning in his mind. Apart from a question of the artificiality， there 
remain further questions. Again， looking to the test B， Austin can not be s註idas a 
legal positivist， because he does not fulfil the criterion II (b). But， isit really so? 
It is wel1 observed that Austin， under the influence of J.Bentham， developed his idea 
as a utilitarian一thefact that Shuman too clearly has recognized. Seen in this light， 
Austin also seems to be a man who had a definte (iふ utilitarian)view as to a nature of 
morals which naturally is not of a systematic character as well as Kelsen's ethical non-
cognitivism. In addition， Austin too made the distinction from such a point of view 
and developed the theory of nature of law characterized by such a distinction in his 
own way. If so， itis not yet clear why Austin is not a legal positivist. 
It is obvious， however， on the basis of Shuman's criticism to W. Friedman that 
he has a firm confidence in his argument. While Friedman， inhis “Legal Theory"， 
has spoken of“Austin' s positivist system"， Shuman attacks on it as misleading “since 
neither Austin's system nor Austin's philosophic outlook was positivistic".28l To state 
a reason of his criticism， he cites al Austin's essay in which Austin urged for his tudents 
to receive instruction in both the law as it is and the law as it ought to be. According 
to this citation both of them or law and morals are to be treated as if they are in a form 
of coexistence， not of the distinction. He may believe， that is why Austin is not a legal 
positivist. Can we really acce 
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to deal with the law as it ought to be， aswell as the lllW as it iS.29) What the essay Is 
going to say， Shuman understands by laying a special emphasis on the latter (Science 
of Legislation). It seems indeed to lead him the conclusion that Austin's system is 
not positivistic. All the same it is sti1 sure that Austin， by emphasizing signi五cance
of the positive law， aimed at to separate the law from the other social phenomena. When 
we regard the matter in this light， Shuman's attempt to separate analytical jurisprudence 
from legal positivism does not deceive us that it stil shows a lack of persuasiveness. 
N ecessity of the Distinction 
Second， itmust be questioned of necessity of the distinction. According to 
Shuman， the distinction is very urgent on the ground that to identify both of them 
has led to the result attached by unnecessary or unexpected misunderstanding and 
criticism. What then is a case caused by such an unexpected identification? It is 
shown by “the belief that analytical jurisprudence caused legal positivism which caused 
or facilitated totalitarianism， and since totalitarianism is bad legal positivism must be bad 
and likewise its cause， analytical jurisprudenceぺ30) This may be an extreme case and 
belief， but， 1 think， there is a proper reason when he emphasizes the necessity. Because 
he concerns with a political consequence of both legal thinkings which come to be ac-
cused for the conspiracy when they were identified. By the way， here appears a dimen-
sion where analytical jurisprudence and legal positivism really get a contact with actua-
lity of socalled mass society， that is， day by day of citizen and lawyer's responsibility 
there. What then has Shuman found such a consequence under this dimension? To 
summarize a way of his argument， itis as follows: 
What analytical jurisprudence deems relevant is the famous belief in sovereign 
power being under no legal restraint. Regarding it in the context of Nazi social system， 
we can not deny a possibi1ty that it influenced the Nazi-Leader-State idea. It does 
not imply， however， that there was decisive influence. For there was another type 
of an idea dominant at that time that a community binded by blood and earth as a 
whole is developed under the leadership of Nazi leader (elite).31) Such is also the 
case with legal positivism. For example， letus imagine a people accepting legal posi-
tivism as a true theory of nature of law who are morally lazy or weak， oreven morally 
pluralistic.32) In addition， legal positivism too， indea1ing with the law regardless of 
mora1ity or moral judgment， exact1y fits the people's attitude. On the basis of the 
popular and lawyer's indifference to the moral matter， tota1itarian politics may power-
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fully controllegal process or judicial process. Such a chance may exist in a consider-
able degree. Seen in this light we can assume that legal positivism and totalitarianism 
are in a relationof cause and effect with one another. But it is again not decisively 
so. What S1 
found in the judicial functionaries during t也h巴Naziperiod. For instance， this is one 
of the reasons why german judges served under the Nazi regime. It does not imply 
that they did so because of their positivstic mind. Even though analytical jurisprudence 
and legal positivism have gotten a contact with Hitler's rising to and maintaining of 
power， both of them do not offer a su伍cientand final reason for the success of Hitler 
and his tota1itarianism at that time. 
As to german judge at that time， however， itshould be remembered that 
there were two types of judges different both in belief and action. As 1 dealt 
with this problem in my another paper， here， 1 shall cite only a phrase written 
by Radbruch in his last years:“Despite of the fact that the highest judicial 
authorities' has been deeply fallen， even in such dark years flame of justice has 
never completely overcome in our judicial practice. The Nuremberg decision， 
too， has recognized this fact. Itdivides judges in the Nazi period into two 
categories. On the one hand， there were judges ‘who with enthusiasm realized 
the will of the Party in such a strict way that they encoutered no di侃cultiesand 
interferences caused by Party 0伍cials'. On the other hand， however， sti1l 
there were judges who dared to maintain the ideal of the independence of judges， 
and decided cases with certain objectivity and self-restraint attitude. Their 
decisions were putted aside by the procedure of the claim to void them or of 
the complaint of extraodinary nature， and yet the defendants sentenced by these 
judges， after the end of the term of their punishment， were entrusted to the 
Gestapo to be shooted or to be sent to the concentration-camp. The judges 
themselves were criticized， threateIled and often fired. 
Besides of al odious decisions made by the administration of justice in the 
Nazi period， the heroic， but modest figure of this another type of judges should 
be never forgotten."34) 
This is an out1ine of Shuman's attempt to disprove the false charge brought against 
both of them. He has succeeded it， for he does not find any necessary and su伍cient
reason enough to prove a cause and effect relation between both and tota1itariani 
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to clarify which of them is to be charged with cooperation with the totalitarianism? 
It seems not so much necessary to distinguish both of them. 
Besides， itis worth noticing that a word legal positivism is used by Shuman 
thoroughly in a delimitted sense. He regards Kelsen as a representative of this legal 
thinking as cited above， and yet he speaks of Kelsen as if he is a sole representative. 
It is true that he is a typical legal positivist. 日islegal positivism， being refined， isa 
critical legal positivism， but legal positivism as a whole is not necessary exhausted to 
the critical legal positivism.35) Socalled conceptual jurisprudence developed in the 
latter half of 19th century Germany was also a kind of legal positivism which remain 
to live even under the Nazi regime by modifying a litle bit its characteristic. Ac-
cordingly， ifwe try to examine a relation betv.氾enlegal positivism and totalitarianism， 
it becomes indeed necessary to allow for such a kind of legal positivism， that is， that 
of conceptual jurisprudence， while Shuman himself gives no allowance for it. Why 
he does not so may come from the way of thinking commonly found in American and 
English who are accustomed to directly discuss and analyze problem before them in 
a way of case by case instead of giving an attention to its background or origin from 
historical point of view.36) Notwithstanding， 1 think， itis stil necessary to consider 
at least factors like those of background so and so of legal positivism. 
Utility of the Distinction 
1 have questioned above to distinguish both. But 1 am not intended natural1y 
to identify them. It is incontrovertible today， particular1y after the 2nd Wor1d War， 
that both are conditioned and given different characteristics by difference of each 
countries in regard to their own cultural traditions wherein both have grown up and 
by di鉦'erenceof the experiences which come from when both have been faced with 
terror of totalitarianism.37) Accordingly， what 1 have questioned is not about the 
distinction itself， but a way of distinction. Let us again consider a meaning of that 
essay given by Austin. Shuman assumed there that Austin emphasized the necessity 
for students to study the law as it ought to be as well as the law as it is. This is al 1 
have cited above. Isn't it， however， very natural attitude for each scholars， not only 
for Austin， unless they might show an extremely sc;eptical attitude to morals， that is， 
moral nihilism? Such is also the case with scholars like Mr. Justice Holmes Jr. or 
J. C. Gray， whereas they have been often condemned as typical representatives of 
legal positivists who merely look to the law as it iS.3B) What is worth giving attention 
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h色reis their way of approach when they dea1s with， discuss and decide 1egal problems. 
At this time， they seems very businesslike in dca1ing with the problems so that they 
main1y take an attitude to distinguish the (positive) law from the other social phenomena. 
From a uti1itarian standpoint it may well be said that they make such a distinction in 
order to avoid unreasonab1e treatment about 1egal prob1ems resulting when identifying 
the 1aw as it is and the law as it ought tobe. Therefore， todistinguish at this time 
does not mean that they are indifferent to the non-1egal phenomena， especially morals， 
but that most of them allow largely for a re1evance of mora1s to the law as it is whenever 
being faced with an aspect of ordinary life or 1egis1ative process， as1 pointed out it in 
my another book.39) This is the same to Kelsen. Though he is famous in the assur-
tion to maintain purity or neutrality of the law and jurisprudence， itis a1so worth 
noticing that his pure theory of law implicitly rests on a belief in individual freedom 
as recognized by Shklar tOO.叫Ifso， does not lega1 positivism come to share a belief 
in morality or value orientation with ana1ytical jurisprudence， and yet in regard to 
some crutial matters? 
On viewing broadly such a way of discussion， we find two possib1e ways to examine 
uti1ty of the distinction of analytical jurisprudence and legal positivism. One is the 
way Shuman has shown. ln comparing progressively both of them， itconfines a word 
1ega1 positivism to a narrower sense for it can find no common 1ink between them. 
On the other hand there is another possib1e way， that is， a traditional which is ready to 
name both together 1egal positivism in a broader sense on1y if common link wi1l be found 
between them. Here， 1 think first， itis natural to characterize both as legal positivism 
according to the traditional way. This being so， within a broader framework of legal 
positivism， 1 think second， itis sti1 necessary to find whence comes difference between 
its parts (to put it tentatively， english styled part and german styled part) and what 
kind of meaning or function causes the difference. ln this respect 1 am not always 
for the traditional way， rather 1 am intended to appreciate the way of stimulating dis-
cussion done by Shuman. 
To understand both kinds of legal thinking under the common name: legal posi-
tivism as well to make a distinction between its parts within a framework of common 
ground may surely app 
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mind that we tend to think of them in either-or form. The other is to aviod unnecessary 
controversy by setting up a common ground and following carefully a translation for-
mula. 
In regard to a translation formula， 1 shall cite here only an idea of late 
professor F. Cohen as an illustration: 
“( 1) Never assume that a philosophical doctrine is a true岨or品lsepro幽
position. Its significance may lie in its function in organizing inquiry. 
( 2 ) Beware of assuming that any particular perspective is pre-eminent 
or that any philosophy is unavoidable or that any truth can be expressed in oly 
one language. 
(3) Never assume that two philosophers who use the same symbol mean 
the same thing， or that those who make apparently contradictory assertIons 
really disagree. They may be talking different languages. 
( 4) In order to determine whether two philosophical doctrines are com輔
patible， incompatible， or identical， look for a formula of translation by which 
propositions within one phi1osophical system may be correlated with equivalent 
propositions in the other."41) 
It must be added here， atthe same teme， toclarify what is a difference between 
them and to make it an object of examination or criticis凪 Whenwe regard the matter 
in this light， can we find another aspect concerning analytical jurisprudence and legal 
positivism? As an il1ustration， 1 shal1 turn to Kelsen's article:“Pure Theory of Law 
and Analyt;cal Jurisprudence" in which ~e analyzed a meaning of his theory in contrast 
to that of Austin. 
Analytical jurisprudence was intended to analyze the positive law as its main subject. 
In this respect， Kelsen has no objection to this thesis， because he has also the same 
、subjectin his pure theory of law. Analytical jurisprudence， however， appears for him 
as such having made several mistakes. One of them is to see the law as rule， and yet 
to see rule as command of sovereign. On the contrary， Kelsen points out that the law 
is norm being in va1idity and it must be treated in an ought proposition. The other 
is the theory of sovereignty under no legal restraint. According to Kelsen， itbegan 
with Austin's accouni for the law as command. But， isit possible to imagine a sovereト
gn who is under no legal restraint even by means of the positive law? It is impossible. 
To put it shprtly， Kelsen criticizes， such a defect comes from the lack to state concept 
in Austinian system.42) Therefore， toput aside it is to afford a key for an advancement. 
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Conc1usion 
Now we come to know， on the basis of Kelsen's comparative analysis， two very 
characteristic views appearing in another aspect said above. One is a view to look 
upon the law as coming from soverign wi1l-decision (but， toput it broadly， man as 
an autonomous subject made decision). The other is a view sti1l looking upon the 
law as norm or rule to distinguish it c1early from man made decision which is used to 
be taken de facto in a sense. While Austin went along the former way， Kelsen is going 
along the latter way. To sum up， itbecomes apprarent that therεare a voluntaristic 
views of law， that is， a view of law as based on man made decision on the one hand， and 
normativistic view of law， that is， rule theory of law on the other. - Remeber a di長田
町ncebetween judge made law and judge declared law! - Shuman does not systemati-
cal1y refer to either man made decisionism or normativism. It may be not necessary， 
as long as we deal with legal tl由民時 withina framework of A (for instance， Aus-
tinian) school of law and B school of law so and so. But to consider significance and 
role of contemporary legal tl巾 ki時， esp~cially legal positivism and analytical jurispru-
dence in connection with judi.cial process or social system today， itseems urgent to 
examine where such a contrast bεtween decisionistic and normativist view comes from， 
let alone the differenc of analytical jurisprudence and legal positivism for themselves. 
To take a familiar example， a view of law as based on man made decision is not unrelated 
with a realistic or fact study of law like sociology of law and sociological jurisprudence 
on the one hand. It is interesting to see here that Kelsen， by having American realist 
in his mind， takes account of relevance of sociology of law or sociological jurisprudence 
and urges for scholars to study it as well as normative jurisprudence， despite of the fact 
that at a glance he looks a legal positivist in a proper sense.43) On the other hand， 
that normativist view of law is basical1y connected with that legalism. In this sense， 
does not normativism become again a common 1ink between natural law and legal 
positivism by offeri時 rulefollowing attitude (morality)? From this it wi1 be seen that 
these two views are sti1l useful to reexamine the subject: legal pos江ivismand analytical 
jurisprudence， after due consideration of both， macro-and micro-approach， that is， to
see both， a wood and a tree， as1 mentioned at the beginning.44) 
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